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Abstract
This study addresses the question of why so many of the world’s legislators are lawyers or law graduates.
Drawing from previous studies on lawyer-legislators and electoral systems, it develops the argument that
‘first-pass-the-post’ single-member district electoral systems presume a principal-agent logic of represen-
tation and are therefore conducive to political parties selecting representatives with either occupational
experience or educational training in the field of law. By contrast, proportional representation (PR) elec-
tions presume a microcosm model of representation incentivizing parties to select candidates representing
diverse demographic and occupational backgrounds. This conjecture is tested by examining legislator
backgrounds in three large parliaments with mixed electoral systems: Germany, Japan, and South
Korea. As expected, single-member plurality elections are linked to a greater share of lawyers and law
graduates in parliaments compared to those elected via PR even after controlling for several alternative
explanations.
Keywords: Electoral systems; Germany; Japan; law; lawyers; parliaments; political selection; proportional representation;
single-member districts; South Korea
An important question in the fields of political science and political economy is why some demo-
graphic and professional groups have more presence and influence than others in politics. Whether
viewed from the perspective of ‘political selection’ (e.g., Besley, 2005) or ‘descriptive representation,’
(e.g., Pitkin, 1967), the occupational and educational backgrounds of legislators have significant con-
sequences for public policy-making due to the role that professional socialization and educational
training plays in shaping law makers’ experiences, perceptions, interests, and behaviors.
In response, scholars have sought to better understand how institutions impact the degree to which
occupational groups enter politics. For instance, research on Germany and Austria finds public
servants more likely to become members of parliament (MPs) when they are guaranteed re-employment,
receive compensation for holding their office in abeyance, and when ineligibility and incompatibility
rules are not present (Braendle and Stutzer, 2010). In Russia, studies have found more businessman can-
didates in regions where democratic institutions (i.e., political parties, free media, and government trans-
parency) are weak (e.g., Gehlbach et al., 2010), and in China, entrepreneurs seem to participate more
in politics in regions where markets are less developed (Li et al., 2006). Meanwhile, the ratio between
salaries for the US Congress and those offered in the private sector appear to impact both the average
‘quality of entering politicians’ and turnover in office (Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008: 599).
The high share of MPs with law backgrounds has also drawn considerable attention (e.g., Hain and
Pierson, 1975; Besley, 2005: 54; Moliterno, 2009; Bonica, 2017; Robinson, 2017). Explanations for the
prevalence of MPs with educational or occupational training in law tend to focus on the socialization
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experience of law school (e.g., Miller, 1993, 1995), lawyers’ professional networks and fundraising abil-
ities (e.g., Bonica, 2017), the structure of the legal profession (e.g., Robinson, 2017), and restrictions in
legislatures concerning legal representation of clients before state entities (Rosenson, 2006). A related
factor is whether MPs are permitted to simultaneously work elsewhere while holding public office
since attractive alternatives in the private sector may dis-incentivize lawyers from running for a pol-
itical position (e.g., Gagliarducci et al., 2010).
Despite these advances, previous attempts to explain the proliferation of lawyers and law graduates
in legislatures have overlooked one of the most basic structural factors of a democratic polity – its
electoral system. At stake here is the common usage of a ‘first-pass-the-post’ (FPTP) single-member
district (SMD) electoral system in the institutional ensemble of many former British colonies includ-
ing the USA where lawyers are particularly prominent in legislatures, a feature which stands in contrast
to many other industrialized democracies where elections rely on some variant of proportional
representation (PR) (e.g., Norris, 2004; Farrell, 2011).
As this article explains, a parliament’s electoral system can play an important role in influencing the
degree to which its membership is comprised of citizens with a background in law defined here as pos-
sessing either a university degree in law (‘law graduates’) or occupational experience working in the field
of law (‘lawyers’). More specifically, this article proposes that SMD elections are more conducive to the
election of MPs with a background in law than PR systems. This presumed causal relationship stems from
differences between whether electoral systems aim to achieve ‘principal-agent’ or ‘microcosmic’ models of
representation (e.g., McLean, 1991; Farrell, 2011: 10–11). On the one hand, SMD elections presume a
principal-agent model of representation which incentivizes political parties to select MPs with training
in the field of law. On the other hand, PR elections presume a microcosmic model of representation
which incentivizes parties to select MPs from diverse demographic and occupational backgrounds.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. First, it reviews the scholarly literature on the causes
and consequences of having a large number of legislators with an educational or occupational back-
ground in law. It then considers how FPTP-SMD and closed-list PR electoral systems may differen-
tially impact the proliferation of lawyers and law graduates in parliaments with the former more
conducive to MPs with a background in law than the latter. This conjecture is then tested and
prima facie evidence is found in support of this relationship through an analysis of elections conducted
in three large parliaments with mixed-member electoral systems combining SMD and PR tiers: Japan,
South Korea, and Germany. The article concludes by discussing the implications of these findings and
suggestions for future research.
1. Literature review
1.1. The proliferation of lawyer-legislators
Comparative research has repeatedly found that educated professionals comprise a large share of the
world’s legislators, and among white-collar occupations present in parliaments, lawyers are particu-
larly prominent (e.g., Miller, 1995; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Norris and Franklin, 1997; Best
and Cotta, 2000; Best and Vogel, 2014; Bonica, 2017). A glaring example of this phenomenon is
the USA where the disproportionate influence of lawyers in politics was famously observed nearly
two centuries ago by de Tocqueville (1838/2003). Since gaining independence in the late eighteenth
century, lawyers have comprised 71% of US Senators and 62% of its House of Representatives
(Bonica, 2017: 4) as well as 100% of Supreme Court judges, 59% of US presidents, 68% of vice pre-
sidents, and 63% of cabinet members (Robinson, 2017: 667). Lawyers have also comprised a high pro-
portion of US state-level legislators estimated at 40% within state senates and 25% within state houses
(Cohen, 1969: 569). As Robinson (2017) notes, lawyers currently constitute only 0.4% of the US popu-
lation, but in 2015–16, lawyers (37%) were the largest occupational group in the US Congress followed
by ‘business and banking’ (26%) and ‘public service and politics’ (23%).
Aside from the US case, lawyers are numerous in many other countries’ legislatures including the
UK and former British colonies (Podmore, 1977). In the 622-member German Bundestag (GBT),
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Braendle and Stutzer (2016: 713) found more legal professionals (102) than any other category includ-
ing educational professions and researchers (86) or public administrators (62). Lawyers have also been
prominent in Canadian politics comprising roughly a fifth of legislators and almost three-fifths of
Canadian Prime Ministers (22 of 30) (Chatoor, 2013: 4). Similarly, Braendle (2015: 9) found a strong
presence of European Parliament members with a degree in law (20%), and a large-scale study con-
ducted by The Economist (2009) has estimated that lawyers comprise about 20% of the world’s poli-
ticians – a greater share than any other professional background including business (16%), diplomacy
(12%), or the military (11%).1
A long-standing question among scholars has been whether legislators with a law background think
and act differently than their counterparts without legal training (e.g., Eulau and Sprague, 1964). In the
US case, due to American Bar Association (ABA) accreditation requirements, the high costs of obtain-
ing a law degree, and the need to pass a bar exam, lawyers are more likely to be white, male, and afflu-
ent compared to non-lawyers (Shepherd, 2003; Michelson, 2013). Moreover, lawyers often ‘come from
more “elite” family backgrounds’ and ‘earn more than typical Americans’ (Robinson, 2017: 694)
resulting in a US Congress dominated by representatives from affluent households (see Carnes,
2013, 2018). Miller’s (1993: 1) interview research found ‘lawyers have more positive attitudes toward
the courts’ than non-lawyers and Eakins (2006) found lawyers in politics to be more ambitious than
non-lawyers. Polsby (1990: 114) also identifies a critical mass effect whereby the ‘occupational culture
of Congress’ in the USA is ‘dominated by lawyers’ ways and lawyers’ jargon.’ As Davidson (1988: 92)
notes, ‘oral debates and written reports display lawmakers’ intense fascination with legal procedures,
concepts, and terminology. And members often reveal a knack for turning substantive issues into mat-
ters of legal or procedural detail – perhaps a belated manifestation of legal training.’2
One alarming possibility is that lawyer-legislators may be systematically biased toward advancing
their own industry and personal gains at the expense of general public interests (Kagan, 2001).
While, in some countries like Russia, businesspeople commonly run as legislative candidates in
order to ‘enjoy unparalleled access to policy decisions’ that help their businesses profit (Szakonyi,
2018: 325; see also Braendle, 2016), a study of roll call votes in the US Congress and state legislatures
regarding the $265 billion a year tort business found lawyers ‘systematically less likely to vote in favour
of tort reforms that restrict tort legislation but more likely to support bills that extend tort law com-
pared to legislators with different professional backgrounds’ (Matter and Stutzer, 2015: 357).
If lawyer-legislators share such biases, then why do so many lawyers enter politics in the first place?
In the US case, lawyers hold many intermediate feeder positions for US state and national legislatures
such as the positions of the state attorney general and public prosecutor (Shepherd, 2003: 654; Francis,
2014: 80; Robinson, 2017: 691). Another reason is their ability to ‘enter and leave politics without dam-
aging their legal careers’ (Miller, 1993: 2). Lawyers can use legislative positions as stepping stones to
advance their careers (Hain and Pierson, 1975), and even losing an election campaign can help
increase their name recognition and network of contacts.3
1The claim by Braendle and Stutzer (2016: 700) that ‘public servants’ are the most highly represented professional group in
parliaments aggregates a large number of occupational categories under the label of ‘public servants’ including those working
in education as teachers and university professors, public administrators, social workers, members of the armed forces, police,
and the judiciary. Hence, it does not contradict earlier findings that lawyers are often the most prevalent occupational group
within legislatures.
2While the US case may be a bit sui generis, Kagan (2001: 3) warns that its lawyer-centric governance model of ‘adversarial
legalism’ referring to ‘policymaking, policy implementation, and dispute resolution by means of lawyer-dominated litigation’
has harmfully led to ‘American laws [that] generally are more detailed, complicated, and prescriptive’ and ‘methods of liti-
gating and adjudicating legal disputes are more costly and adversarial’ (ibid). However, as Robinson (2017: 719) observes,
‘adversarial legalism itself is arguably produced in part by lawyers’ prevalence in politics in the first place’ as lawyer-legislators
are more prone to support a ‘lawyer- and court-centric vision of public governance’ (ibid: 707).
3As Mattozzi and Merlo (2008) have argued, there is a difference between ‘career politicians’ who continue to serve in
politics until retirement and ‘political careers’ whereby professionals temporarily serve in politics before returning back to
the private sector. The latter may be suitable to many lawyers for whom previous experience as a legislator may be lucrative
for future employment outside the legislature.
Japanese Journal of Political Science 3
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Some scholarship also suggests the socialization experience of obtaining a law degree is a strong
factor in shaping law graduates’ desire to enter politics. As Miller (1993: 4) notes, regardless of whether
law graduates ever become practicing attorneys, law school socialization has a long-term influence and
‘professional training produces changes in individuals which stay with them throughout their subse-
quent careers.’ For instance, legal training may enrich a future politician’s logic, reasoning, debating
skills, and ability to persuade (e.g., Podmore, 1977).4 Yet, it might also make them ‘accustomed to
representing clients’ [private] interests against the interests of all others, including the public interest’
(Moliterno, 2009: 1262). As Miller (1995) has argued, legal training also leads lawyers to approach
problems differently by preferring a ‘case-by-case approach in attacking a problem’ and placing
legal analysis over ‘consideration of broader values’ (Miller, 1993: 5). Law graduates might also be
more likely to ‘think of themselves as qualified to run’ or have ‘an elected official as a family member
or as a friend’ (Robinson, 2017: 687) thus providing them with more insider knowledge and self-
confidence than other potential candidates. Relatedly, Eulau and Sprague (1964) found many who
chose to enter law school already had an above average interest in politics. Nevertheless, a generally
higher level of interest among law graduates for joining politics still does not explain the variation
in MPs with a law background within and across countries – perhaps electoral systems do?
1.2. Electoral systems and occupational representation
As Besley (2005: 52) has argued, compared to inheritance, lotteries, and force, ‘elections are now the
most commonly used institution for selecting a political class, but enormous diversity exists across elect-
oral institutions.’ While scholars have not yet considered how electoral system differences impact the
election of lawyers, the possibility of a systematic link between electoral systems and candidate selection
methods has been identified by Hazan and Voerman (2006: 148) who propose that candidate selection
methods will be more decentralized under SMD plurality electoral systems, but more centralized in
multi-member districts. Partially confirming these conjectures, a study comparing the candidate selec-
tion methods of 512 parties in 46 countries concluded that on average ‘parties competing in unitary sys-
tems will tend to adopt more centralized and exclusive selection processes, whereas parties under federal
countries will adopt more inclusive and decentralized selection mechanisms’ (Shomer, 2014: 543).
While there may be a link between SMDs and decentralized candidate selection procedures, SMD
electoral systems exhibit other characteristics conducive to the selection of lawyer candidates. First, the
literature on electoral systems has identified the differing character of SMD and PR in terms of com-
petition structure and nomination patterns as the former is uninominal (district magnitude = 1), while
the latter employs multi-member districts with correspondingly higher district and party magnitudes
(e.g., Duverger, 1954; Rae, 1967; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Norris, 2004; Farrell, 2011). Moreover,
a general finding is that PR (especially when using a closed-list) tends to be more inclusive of diversity
than SMD when it comes to electing otherwise under-represented population groups such as women
and young people (e.g., Matland and Studlar, 1996; Norris, 2004; Joshi, 2013; Joshi and Kingma, 2013;
Reiser, 2014).
Second, SMD creates an adversarial winner-take-all contest. This incentivizes candidates in com-
petitive districts to excel in matters such as persuasion, fundraising, and perseverance to out-compete
adversaries. Of particular importance is a candidate’s personal appeal linked to the ‘personal vote,’
whereas party reputation and ideology are relatively more important in closed-list PR systems
(Carey and Shugart, 1995). As Herron et al. (2018: 451) note, candidates elected under SMD systems
are often expected or motivated to ‘work for local interests, while candidates under PR work for
4As Besley (2005: 49) has pointed out, a ‘fiduciary model’ of duty in politics corresponds to ‘the idea that some people hold
public office due to public service motivation’ which may fit well with MPs who come from a law background. However, it is
an open question as to whether MPs with a law background have more or less public service motivation than other MPs and
whether they are more disposed to fitting a trustee model of public representation.
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broader interests.’ For this reason, political parties often see law graduates and lawyers who have been
trained to vigorously advocate on behalf of a narrow client base as attractive candidates for SMDs
(Lawless, 2012; Francis, 2014).
Third, as Galasso and Nannicini (2017) point out, political parties’ top preference is often to select
‘loyal candidates’ (especially party elites and long-term party members) as evident in candidate nomi-
nations for the top of their PR-lists and for safe SMD seats. However, parties may experience a back-
lash from electorates in SMD contests if they do not choose ‘high-quality’ candidates (those with more
education and higher incomes) such as lawyers, which were found more often to be representing com-
petitive SMDs under Italy’s previously mixed electoral system (ibid).
2. Causal logic and hypotheses
The discussion above highlights the propensity of lawyers and law graduates to enter parliaments when
an FPTP-SMD electoral system is in place, and it illustrates that different electoral systems might lead to
different results for political selection. Regarding the latter, electoral systems differ in character based on
the degree to which they are linked to different logics or models of representation. A crucial distinction
here is between ‘principal-agent’ and ‘microcosm’ models (McLean, 1991; Farrell, 2011: 10–11).
First, a principal-agent model of representation lies behind SMD elections because the district mag-
nitude is only one. Under these circumstances, legal training will likely facilitate agentic representation
because legal advocacy of the type embedded in the lawyer–client relationship studied in law school
and practiced in the legal profession corresponds to a parliamentary representative who acts on behalf
of a specific geographic constituency based on the incentive of re-election. For this reason, given the
skills of those with a law background and the fact that entrance to a law degree program is often avail-
able only to those with a high level of intellectual acumen, political parties are likely to choose a sizable
number of lawyers to serve as representatives under SMD systems.
By contrast, PR elections imply a microcosmic model of representation in which a legislature is sup-
posed to resemble the population at large. As articulated by John Adams, this vision expects parlia-
ment to function like ‘an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large, as it should think, feel,
reason, and act like them’ (quoted in McLean, 1991:173). As Farrell (2011: 10) points out, this is
very ‘similar to the governing principle behind public opinion polls: that is, the notion of a represen-
tative sample.’ Hence under PR elections (especially of the closed-list variety), diversity of representa-
tives across occupational and demographic groups is usually preferred by party elites in comprising
candidate lists over concentration from a single profession in order to better inform overall decision-
making and to demonstrate to different segments of voters that people like them will be included as
representatives.
To sum up, SMD elections presume a principal-agent model of representation which I argue incen-
tivizes political parties to select more MPs with training in the field of law than would be the case
under PR elections. This leads us to the following hypotheses. Although the literature tends to conflate
the two, I first distinguish between ‘law graduates’ (those with a university degree in law) and ‘lawyers’
(those whose occupation is in the field of law). My null hypothesis (H0) is that politics simply attracts
law graduates and lawyers in general, so there should be no significant difference in their share elected
under SMD or PR systems. By contrast, my first hypothesis (H1) is that despite differences across
nations in their share of law-graduate MPs, in each individual parliament, law graduates will hold a
greater share of SMD seats than PR seats.5 My second hypothesis (H2) is that despite differences across
nations in their share of MPs in law-related occupations (‘lawyers’), in each individual parliament, law-
yers will hold a greater share of SMD seats than PR seats.
5Academic studies often use a law degree to identify MPs with a law background (e.g., Bonica, 2017; Robinson, 2017;
Aldrich, 2018). Studies on the USA have also found a high overlap between occupational and educational coding of lawyer-
legislators. For instance, Robinson (2017: 665) found 36.5% of the 114th US Congress had previously been a ‘lawyer’ while
39.1% had a ‘law degree.’
Japanese Journal of Political Science 5
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3. Methodology
To test these hypotheses, I examined three large national parliaments with mixed electoral systems
combining both SMD and PR elections. This approach enables isolating the impact of distinct electoral
systems in a context where two different elections are held side-by-side. It also serves as a convenient
means to control for factors such as country-specific conditions, election timing, type and level of
legislature, and partisan competition. In other words, mixed electoral systems allow one to compare
election rates of lawyers and law graduates under different electoral systems while holding most
other relevant factors constant.
My analysis begins with South Korea’s unicameral parliament, the Korean National Assembly
(KNA) (대한민국 국회Daehanminguk Gukhoe), which employs a parallel ‘majoritarian’ mixed-
member (MMM) electoral systems involving strict ‘separation’ between electoral tiers. This is a case
where the two electoral tiers disallow dual candidacy. In other words, a candidate must either contest
an SMD seat or be placed on a PR-list. They cannot do both simultaneously. I then replicate this ana-
lysis on the mixed-member electoral systems of the German Bundestag (GBT) and Japanese House of
Representatives (JHR) (衆議院Shugiin) which comprise the lower houses of their respective bicameral
national parliaments. The GBT and JHR, respectively, have mixed-member proportional (MMP) and
MMM systems involving contamination between their two electoral tiers by allowing dual candidacy.6
These three national assemblies share certain similarities. All have a large number of seats and are
located in advanced industrialized democratic countries that are members of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In each of these parliamentary chambers, voters
have two votes. The first vote is for an SMD seat based on a plurality FPTP formula, while the second
vote is for the PR tier involving closed-lists compiled by political parties over which voters have no say
in determining who the candidates are or in what order on the list.7 In all three cases (Germany, Japan,
and South Korea), the parliaments are genuinely influential institutions in national politics, and MP
salaries are substantial and identical for members elected via PR-lists and SMD seats. Reported
monthly salaries (and their US$ equivalents) are 1,294,000 yen ($11,570) for the Japanese National
Diet (国会Kokkai), 9,780.28 euros ($11,145) plus an allowance of 4,339.97 euros ($4,946) for the
GBT, and 11,496,667 won ($10,096) for the KNA.8 In these three assemblies, law is a prominent back-
ground (occupation or university major) among current representatives as shown in Table 1. In the
JHR and KNA, law is the most common university degree held by MPs. In the GBT, law is the
most common previous occupation among its current MPs.
In the analysis that follows, I focus on statistically significant differences between MPs with law
backgrounds in SMD and PR seats across individual parliamentary sessions. To assess legislator back-
grounds, information was obtained from MP profiles on parliamentary websites regarding their occu-
pational and educational backgrounds for MPs serving during the last four parliamentary sessions in
each country.9 Data were also collected on the current membership of the Japanese House of
Councilors (JHC) (参議院 Sangiin) which forms the upper house of the Japanese Diet.10 In all
cases, MPs were coded as having a ‘law background’ based on their either having a university degree
6As a result, due to dual candidacy, many candidates who ‘lose’ in Japanese SMD elections still enter parliament since the
major parties tend to add their ‘best losers’ (惜敗率 sekihairitsu) in terms of closeness to winning district seats onto com-
petitive spots on their PR-lists (Reed and Thies, 2001: 383).
7A partial exception is the ‘best loser’ system applied in Japan’s lower house, but as Shugart and Wattenberg (2001: 12)
argue, ‘from the point of view of voter choice, the best-loser list is no different from a closed list’ since ‘voters do not have the
opportunity to select from among multiple candidates within their party’s list.’
8Salary data sources [Korea (http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?art_id=201605082303005), Japan
(http://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/search/elawsSearch/elaws_search/lsg0500/detail?lawId=322AC0000000080), Germany (https://www.
bundestag.de/en/members/remuneration)] were accessed on 25 October 2018.
9Data on Germany draws from Och et al. (2018). I would like to thank Malliga Och for sharing her historical data on the
German Bundestag.
10The Japanese House of Councillors combines PR and SNTV (single non-transferable vote) electoral tiers, but within the
SNTV tier some seats are single-member districts.
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in law or being listed on their respective parliament website as having a law-related occupation such as
‘lawyer,’ ‘attorney,’ ‘judge,’ ‘jurist,’ or ‘legal advisor.’ As MP background information is presented dif-
ferently on parliament websites in each country, the coding of law backgrounds for South Korea and
Japan are based on university degrees. For Germany, it is based on occupation.
4. Analysis
My empirical analysis begins with the KNA where over the past four elections, 23.3–31.7% of KNA
members have been law graduates. The KNA is an ideal case to test my first hypothesis, because it
has a ‘strictly’ parallel electoral system that does not allow dual candidacy while combining FPTP
single-member districts with a relatively high-magnitude PR tier comprising one nationwide constitu-
ency. In line with my expectations, as shown in Table 2, over the past four KNA elections, there has
consistently been a much lower share of law graduates in its PR tier (6.6–23.3%) than in SMD seats
(27.0–33.7%).
I then analyzed the lower houses of the parliaments of Japan and Germany which allow dual can-
didacy but nevertheless have a large number of both PR and SMD seats thereby offering a further
opportunity to explore the plausibility of my hypotheses. In Germany, MPs with work experience
in law-related occupations comprised 19.8–20.8% of the GBT over the past four elections, but resem-
bling the pattern observed for law graduates in South Korea, the share of lawyers in the Bundestag’s
SMD-tier (21.4–31.0%) has consistently been higher than in its PR-tier (12.3–18.1%).
By contrast, there has been a greater share of law graduates ranging from 34.2 to 37.7% in the JHR
over its past four elections. However, even in this law-heavy context,11 where laws governing campaign
periods (only 12 days) and permissible activities are fairly restrictive (Nemoto, 2018), and ‘having a
legal background increases the likelihood of an MP serving in a high-policy post’ (Pekkanen et al.,
2006: 188), the electoral system is correlated with the election of citizens with educational training
in law. In the JHR, the share of law graduates elected in SMDs (38.0–43.4%) has consistently been
much higher than in the PR tier (27.2–31.3%).
Lastly, I examined the current composition of the JHC which (like the KNA) bans dual candidacy
but practices staggered elections with half of its members elected every 3 years. Law graduates com-
prise a fairly high share (29.9%) of its 241 current members (as of February 2019) who are much more
prevalent in SMD seats (32.3% of 65 SMD seat holders) compared to the PR tier where their share is
only 20.8% (out of 96 MPs).12
5. Discussion
Across all three countries and every election examined, we observed a regular pattern. There has con-
sistently been a greater share of law graduates and lawyers in SMD seats than in PR seats in Germany,
South Korea, and Japan. This gap exceeded 9 percentage points in 12 out of 13 assembly sessions and
Table 1. Most common occupations/university majors among members of parliament
Election year Indicator #1 Field (%) #2 Field (%) #3 Field (%)
Japan 2017 University Degree Law (36.6) Economics (13.5) Business (7.1)
South Korea 2016 University Degree Law (20.5) Political Sci. (10.7) Pub. Admin. (10.1)
Germany 2017 Occupation Law (18.7) Economist (5.4) Business (5.1)
Data Source: Compiled from member bios on parliamentary websites.
Note: ‘Political Sci.’ includes International Relations and Diplomacy.
11As Michelson (2013: 1092) notes, ‘in Japan, licensed lawyers are outnumbered many times over by non-lawyers who do
similar legal work.’
12Japan’s House of Councillors has a 96-seat PR tier and a 146-seat SNTV tier. In the current parliament, 65 seats (44.8%)
in the SNTV (single non-transferable vote) tier were elected as SMDs.
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was statistically significant as measured by χ2 tests at the P < 0.05 level in nine cases and at the P < 0.12
level in 12 cases.13 Overall these findings support my two hypotheses.
What we do not know yet, however, is whether candidates with a law background become MPs in
these assemblies because of self-selection, party selection, or election by voters. One limitation of this
study is its inability to identify which one of these causal mechanisms has the greatest impact, but
theoretically, much of the literature on political recruitment (following Norris and Lovenduski’s
(1995) candidate supply-demand model) would suggest it is party selection. This is because lawyers
are often present as MP candidates on the supply side, but on the demand side, political parties largely
determine who the candidates are that voters can choose from by accepting or rejecting aspirant can-
didate’s wishes to be nominated as candidates (ibid: 107–115). This in turn heavily influences the
choices available to voters and whether citizens pursue candidacy in the first place.
The principal-agent logic embedded in SMD electoral systems also suggests that party selection
plays a greater role than self-selection or selection through the electorate. As discussed above, due
to their training and experience, there are good reasons to believe that candidates with a law back-
ground will be more inclined toward becoming legislators than the average person regardless of the
electoral system. However, party leaders should be more likely to select candidates with a law back-
ground to represent a constituency when facing an SMD election than under PR-list elections since
the latter incentivizes them to broaden and diversify the profile/backgrounds of candidates on the bal-
lot. The role of party selection here is especially salient in non-competitive SMD-FPTP districts and in
closed PR-lists where voters have no say over the actual candidates offered to them by parties because
candidates and their ranking are determined almost exclusively by party elites. Another commonality
amongst the cases studied here is that despite differing candidate recruitment methods across coun-
tries and political parties, scholars generally find party elites in control of candidate selection proce-
dures in Japan (e.g., Yu et al., 2014), Germany (e.g., Reiser, 2014; Zittel, 2018), and South Korea (e.g.,
Jun and Hix, 2010).
While the findings of this study will require subsequent validation obtained by investigating more
cases both spatially and temporally and applying sophisticated techniques to control for other possible
Table 2. MPs with law backgrounds (LBMPs) in parliaments with mixed electoral systems
Assembly and election year SMD PR Difference
MPs LBMPs LBMPs% MPs LBMPs LBMPs% SMD-PR gap χ2 test (P-value)
KNA 2004 250 84 33.6 62 8 12.9 20.7*** 0.001
KNA 2008 255 86 33.7 60 14 23.3 10.4 0.119
KNA 2012 265 72 27.2 61 4 6.6 20.6*** 0.001
KNA 2016 244 66 27.0 54 9 16.7 10.4 0.112
GBT 2005 299 64 21.4 343 62 18.1 3.3 0.289
GBT 2009 299 77 25.8 351 58 16.5 9.2*** 0.004
GBT 2013 297 92 31.0 357 44 12.3 18.7*** 0.000
GBT 2017 299 77 25.8 411 64 15.6 10.2*** 0.001
JHR 2009 300 114 38.0 179 50 27.9 10.1** 0.025
JHR 2012 300 130 43.3 180 51 28.3 15.0*** 0.001
JHR 2014 295 128 43.4 180 49 27.2 16.2*** 0.000
JHR 2017 289 119 41.2 176 55 31.3 9.9** 0.032
JHC 2016 65 21 32.3 96 20 20.8 11.5 0.101
Data Source: Author’s dataset.
Note: Table includes the Korean National Assembly (KNA), German Bundestag (GBT), Japanese House of Representatives (JHR), and
Japanese House of Councilors (JHC).
KNA members also include mid-term replacements. Asterisks mark statistically significant differences as measured by χ2 tests, P-values:
*<0.10, **<0.05, ***<0.01.s
13The relatively lower number of SMD seats (65) in the SNTV tier of the JHC and PR-list seats in the KNA (54 to 62) both
inhibited the attainment of statistical significance in those two assemblies as measured by χ2 tests (resulting in P-values
slightly over 0.10 for some years) compared to the larger PR and SMD tiers of the JHC and GBT (see Table 2).
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contravening factors, our hypotheses here have nevertheless received noticeable support under some-
what diverse conditions. As noted above, the assemblies we examined diverge in terms of their mixed-
electoral system configurations. First, their share of PR-list seats ranges considerably from 50% in
Germany and 38% in Japan to 15% in South Korea. Average district magnitude for the PR tier varies
from 18 (ranging from 7 to 33) in the JHR to one nationwide district of 46 for the KNA and a ‘de facto’
national district of 656 for the GBT (on the latter, see Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001; Zittel, 2018). The
legal minimum threshold of party votes for PR allocation also varies from 5% or three SMD seats for
Germany and 3% for South Korea to none for Japan. As Germany has the most PR-list seats, it argu-
ably has a much weaker personal vote among the three countries.14 Germany also features ‘overhang
seats’ (Überhangmandate) which ‘actually increase the total number of seats in the chamber in order to
allow all other parties to receive their full complement of list-tier seats despite the bonus obtained by
some large parties’ (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001: 23).
Another source of variation is the presence of dual candidacy in the GBT and JHR where PR-list
members of parliament from the largest parties are assigned by their parties to a district constituency
to which they provide constituency service.15 Hence, the widespread practice of dual candidacies in
Germany and Japan (e.g., Klingemann and Wessels, 2001; Reiser, 2014; Nemoto, 2018)16 introduces
an element of ‘contamination’ between the two electoral tiers since ‘dual candidacy systems can gen-
erate dually nominated list winners who lose in the nominal component but win seats via the list com-
ponent’ (Herron et al., 2018: 447). In other words, because there is less separation between the
electoral tiers in Germany and Japan, the types of candidates chosen to contest SMD seats may be
similar to those on PR-lists.17
To sum up, there is considerable diversity amongst the assemblies examined here. Arguably,
Germany with its high level of contamination between nominal and proportional electoral tiers,
and the presence of dual candidacies in the GBT and JHR present a stricter, tougher test of my
hypotheses than either the KNA or JHC where there is a clear separation of the two electoral systems
allowing for a more ‘controlled comparison’ akin to a natural experiment (Herron et al., 2018: 446).
Nevertheless, across all four legislative chambers, the results were in line with my theoretical expecta-
tions about the link between electoral systems and MPs with a law background.
6. Conclusion
This paper offers the first academic study to address the question of whether electoral systems contrib-
ute to differential proportions of MPs with a law background by conducting an empirical examination
of multiple parliamentary sessions in three advanced industrialized democracies with large legislatures
that combine SMD-FPTP and closed-list PR electoral tiers: Japan, South Korea, and Germany. Across
four chambers and 13 parliamentary sessions, we found more MPs with a law background in SMDs
than in PR seats, and in a majority of individual parliamentary sessions, this difference was statistically
significant.
Additionally, this study took into consideration mixed electoral system diversity by studying both
parallel MMM systems and a compensatory MMP system. Across both systems, a much higher share
of lawyer-legislators in FPTP-SMDs compared to closed-list PR seats was confirmed to be an empirical
14Moser and Scheiner (2005: 259) found in the nominal tier of mixed-member electoral systems, that ‘the personal vote
plays a central part…except for Germany, a heavily party-oriented system in which we find evidence of only a weak personal
vote.’
15As Reed and Thies (2001: 401) note, in Japan, a candidate who loses an SMD election, but gets elected on a PR-list seat
‘will continue to act as if he represents the [district] and plans to run there again in the next election.’
16In Japan, ‘dually nominated list winners’ or ‘zombies’ (Pekkanen et al., 2006) have been increasing on the list component
from 42% in 1996 to 67% in 2014 (Nemoto, 2018).
17Herron et al. (2018: 450) find that ‘under any mixed-member systems – MMM or MMP – winning a constituency race
guarantees a candidate a seat. Particularly for this reason, constituency seats may be perceived as more valuable prizes to
acquire in the long term.’
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regularity. South Korea with a clear-cut separation of its two electoral tiers offered the most direct test
of the paper’s main hypothesis, but the fact that Germany and Japan (which practice dual candidacy)
provided almost the same exact results provides additional tentative support for the article’s theoretical
expectation that SMD is more conducive to law graduates and lawyers entering parliaments than PR
electoral systems.
Regarding possible mechanisms (i.e., self-selection, party-selection, and voter-selection) that may
explain the link between SMD and lawyers and observed differences between SMD and PR elections,
it will be important for future research to delve into which of these mechanisms plays a stronger role
than the others by studying the occupational backgrounds of the candidate pool.18 It will also be useful
for future research to extend the scope of this study to other occupational groups, countries, and time
periods as well as to sub-national legislatures. A broader multi-country analysis could also probe the
selection effects of complementary institutions beyond just electoral systems and it would be worth-
while to examine the effects of electoral system changes from SMD to PR or vice versa and look into
diversity amongst law graduates since persons trained in law can function in various roles as a sole
practitioner, member of a law firm, as in-house counsel, in work for the government, or work in a
field other than law (Chatoor, 2013: 11). Lastly, another distinction worth considering in future
research is the extent to which electoral systems are related to the election of MPs with a law back-
ground who formerly served as prosecutors, public defenders, and judges, or who hail from non-profit
and activist backgrounds (Robinson, 2017: 680).
In conclusion, this study provisionally found single-member districts bringing citizens with a law
background into legislatures at a greater rate than under PR elections even after taking into consider-
ation national-level characteristics and factors such as election timing, partisan competition, and
legislature size. Though these initial findings should be studied further in other contexts and with
alternative methods, they tentatively suggest that SMD elections may be better suited for societies
which aim to have a high share of lawyers or law graduates as legislators. On the other hand, it appears
that those societies interested in minimizing or curtailing the share of lawyers and law graduates in
their parliaments might be better served with PR electoral systems.
Supplementary material. The supplementary material for this article can be found at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.
xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/4KRXD3.
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